Can Existence and Nomicity Devolve from Axiological
Principles?
Norman Swartz
Abstract
[0] In The Riddle of Existence (1984), Nicholas Rescher
tries to answer the question "Why is there anything?" by arguing that
existence is necessitated by protolaws and that protolaws, in turn,
maximize self-validating `cosmic' values. Both stages of the argument
are open to objection. Not only does positing protolaws require a
powerful `existence principle', like every weaker theory of nomicity
it reverses the semantic truth-making relation. But even if the first
stage were not exceptionally problematic, the second stage of the
argument is irreparable. For no principle which is logically powerful
enough to account for the existence of protolaws can contain the
descriptive terms of such laws, have the requisite degree of
specificity, and be self-validating.