__
             /_/                    T h e
    _____   __ _____   _____
   / ___ \ / // ___ \ / ___ \       E l e c t r o n i c   J o u r n a l
  / /____// // /__/ // /__/ /
  \_____// / \___/_// _____/        o f
     ___/ /        / /
    /____/        /_/               A n a l y t i c   P h i l o s o p h y

 -------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Issue 1, August 1993                                      ISSN: 1071-5800
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------



 ABSTRACTS


 Can Existence and Nomicity Devolve                          Norman Swartz
      from Axiological Principles?

         In _The_Riddle_of_Existence_ (1984), Nicholas Rescher
    tries to answer the question "Why is there anything?" by
    arguing that existence is necessitated by protolaws and that
    protolaws, in turn, maximize self-validating `cosmic' values.
    Both stages of the argument are open to objection.  Not only
    does positing protolaws require a powerful `existence
    principle', like every weaker theory of nomicity it reverses
    the semantic truth-making relation.  But even if the first
    stage were not exceptionally problematic, the second stage of
    the argument is irreparable.  For no principle which is
    logically powerful enough to account for the existence of
    protolaws can contain the descriptive terms of such laws, have
    the requisite degree of specificity, _and_ be self-validating.

    Filename: swartz.1993.august.txt

 
 Emergence Unscathed: Kim on Non-Reducible Types            Ron McClamrock

          Jaegwon Kim has recently argued that the widespread
     assumption of the multiple realizability of higher-level
     kinds -- and in particular, psychological kinds --
     conflicts with some fundamental constraints on both
     materialistic metaphysics and scientific taxonomy.  Kim
     concludes that the multiple realizability of psychological
     kinds would leave them "disqualified as proper scientific
     kinds" (Kim 1992: 18), and that search for a scientific
     psychology should focus instead on more reductive or type-
     materialist possibilities.  If correct, this would strikingly
     undermine a widespread assumption in the philosophy of mind
     and cognitive science.  But it's not.

     Filename: mcclamrock.1993.august.txt


 Rationality, Judgment, and Critical Inquiry                    Paul Healy

         In an insightful recent work, Harold Brown has revealed
    the shortcomings of the classical rule-governed
    (foundationalist) concept of rationality, and has sketched the
    groundplan for a new model which does greater justice to the
    findings of recent research in the history and philosophy of
    science.  Particularly worthwhile features of the new model
    are its vindication of the (generally ignored but crucial) role
    of judgment in inquiry, the social (intersubjective) basis of
    rational decision-making, and the contextual and historically
    conditioned nature of evidence assessment.  Taking these aspects
    of Brown's analysis as its starting point, the present paper
    seeks to provide additional arguments in support of his
    conclusions, while refining and expanding Brown's thesis at
    points at which his arguments are found wanting.  I begin with
    consideration of the case for judgment as an intrinsic component
    of critical inquiry.

    Filename: healy.1993.august.txt


 Conscious Computations                            Valerie Gray Hardcastle

         In his "Computation and Consciousness," Tim Maudlin (1989)
    argues that the impossibility of any computationalist theory of
    consciousness follows more or less directly from three very
    simple principles of computationalism.  Here I argue that Maudlin
    errs by misconceiving the difference between an algorithm for
    computing some function and the actual computations.  This
    distinction is important because it helps clarify the significance
    of supervenience in theories of the mind.  Moreover, it allows
    that a computational theory of consciousness is still a viable
    possibility.

    Filename: hardcastle.1993.august.txt


 Do T-Theories Display Senses?                                Peter Ludlow

          One of the central ideas in recent philosophy of language
     has been the notion that a semantic theory should take the form of
     a theory which delivers Tarskian truth conditions for sentences
     of the language under study.  Much of the interest in such
     theories has stemmed from the suggestion that T-theories can
     deliver more than the truth conditions of expressions, but that
     they can deliver the truth conditions in a way that "shows" or
     "displays" the sense of the expressions.  In this paper it is
     argued that while it might be advantageous if T-theories *could*
     display senses, it is in fact far from clear that they *can*
     display senses.

     Filename: ludlow.1993.august.txt



             +-----------------------------------------------+
             | Published by the Analytic Philosophy Project. |
             |                                               |
             |       TECHNICAL EDITOR:  Tim Maletic          |
             |                                               |
             |       GENERAL EDITOR:  Craig DeLancey         |
             |                                               |
             |       EDITORS:  Karen Leigh Brown             |
             |                 Anthony Chemero               |
             |                 Nino Cocchiarella             |
             |                 Eric Dalton                   |
             |                 Eric Hammer                   |
             |                 Adam Kovach                   |
             +-----------------------------------------------+