Rationality, Judgment, and Critical Inquiry
Paul Healy
Abstract
[0] In an insightful recent work, Harold Brown has revealed the
shortcomings of the classical rule-governed (foundationalist) concept
of rationality, and has sketched the groundplan for a new model which
does greater justice to the findings of recent research in the history
and philosophy of science. Particularly worthwhile features of the
new model are its vindication of the (generally ignored but crucial)
role of judgment in inquiry, the social (intersubjective) basis of
rational decision-making, and the contextual and historically
conditioned nature of evidence assessment. Taking these aspects of
Brown's analysis as its starting point, the present paper seeks to
provide additional arguments in support of his conclusions, while
refining and expanding Brown's thesis at points at which his arguments
are found wanting. I begin with consideration of the case for
judgment as an intrinsic component of critical inquiry.